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In contrast  to several  studies  presented  in the  literature  which  analyze  how  different  political  elements
affect  speciﬁc  aspects  of ﬁnancial  management  of public  institutions,  we have  investigated  from  a com-
prehensive  perspective  how  various  political  factors  inﬂuence  the  ﬁnancial  situation  of  the  municipalities.
To  do this,  we  use  diverse  multivariate  techniques,  the concept  of ﬁnancial  condition  and a  large  sample  of
Spanish  municipalities.  By isolating  the electoral  cycle  and  analyzing  the  essence  of  political  factors,  our
main ﬁndings  are  that  conservative  and  progressive  parties  do not  present  different  behavior  in  relation  to
any of  the  ﬁnancial  dimensions.  The  territoriality  of  political  parties  inﬂuences  the  relationship  between
fund  transfers  received  by the  municipalities  and  certain  expenses  and  investments.  Furthermore,  we
did not  detect  that,  in  Spain,  a partisan  alignment  exists  between  municipalities  and  the  upper-level
institutions.
©  2013  AEDEM.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All rights  reserved.
Situación  ﬁnanciera  y  partidos  políticos  en  los  gobiernos  locales:  evidencia
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r  e  s  u  m  e  n
En  contraste  con  los  diversos  estudios  presentes  en  la literatura  que analizan  cómo  los  diferentes  ele-
mentos  políticos  afectan  a aspectos  especíﬁcos  de  la gestión  ﬁnanciera  de  las  instituciones  públicas,
hemos  investigado  desde  una  perspectiva  integral  cómo  varios  factores  políticos  inﬂuyen  en la situación
ﬁnanciera  de  los  municipios.  Para  ello hemos  usado  diversas  técnicas  multivariantes,  el  concepto  de  condi-inanzas públicas
dministraciones públicas
artidos políticos
ción ﬁnanciera  y una  amplia  muestra  de  municipios  espan˜oles.  Aislando  el ciclo  electoral  y  analizando
la  esencia  de  los factores  políticos,  nuestros  principales  hallazgos  son  que  los  partidos  conservadores  y
progresistas  no  presentan  distintas  conductas  en  las  diferentes  dimensiones  ﬁnancieras,  y que  la  terri-
torialidad  de  los  partidos  políticos  inﬂuye  en  la  relación  entre  los  fondos  recibidos  por  transferencias  y
ciertos gastos  e inversiones.  Además,  no  hemos  detectado  que  exista  un  alineamiento  partidista  entre  los
s  ins
013  Amunicipios  espan˜oles  y la
© 2
. Introduction
Studies analysing the inﬂuence of political factors on speciﬁc
spects of ﬁnancial management of public administrations, as
eﬁcit, expenditures, tax burden, revenues, public debt, and trans-
ers at different territorial levels are, numerous (Benito & Bastida,
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E.J. Buch Gómez), vaamonde@uvigo.es (A. Vaamonde Liste).
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2010; Poterba, 1994; Rattsø & Tovmo, 2002; Roubini & Sachs, 1989;
Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Veiga & Veiga, 2007).
Unlike these previous studies, García-Sánchez, Mordan, and
Prado-Lorenzo (2012) analyzed the effect that political ideology
and strength have on overall ﬁnancial management of local gov-
ernments through analysis of the ﬁnancial condition concept in
the largest Spanish municipalities. However, this study was lim-
ited because they directly assigned indicators to the ﬁnancial
dimensions, and performed individually the political variables
on each of the indicators from a limited set. Furthermore, using
various indicators which may  reﬂect the same behavior tends
ts reserved.
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o distort the analysis because this promotes the assessment of
spects in a duplicate manner (Cabaleiro, Buch, & Vaamonde,
012).
Different from the rest of the studies presented in the literature,
ur paper is based on a more comprehensive vision that eliminates
he analysis of redundant ﬁnancial aspects and it intends to explain
ow different political factors such as ideology, political weakness
f governments, and alignment between political hierarchical insti-
utions (which have not presented conclusive results in previous
orks), or territoriality of political parties (which have not been
mpirically veriﬁed) may  be inﬂuencing the overall ﬁnancial health
f local governments.
. Literature review: background and hypotheses
.1. The ﬁnancial health of local governments
Various terms that correspond to different methodological
pproaches were used in the literature to analyze the same real-
ty, the ﬁnancial health (Berne, 1992; Clark, 1994; Carmeli, 2003;
loha, Weissert, & Kleine, 2005; Wang, Dennis, & Tu, 2007), and the
nancial condition is one of the terms most widely used (Cabaleiro
t al., 2012; Rivenbark & Roenigk, 2011; Sohl, Peddle, Thurmaier,
ood, & Kuhn, 2009; Wang et al., 2007). In this sense, Honadle,
osta, and Cigler (2004) noted that ﬁnancial condition of local
nstitutions is a term closely linked to the concept of ﬁscal health
nd Wang et al. (2007) pointed out that this concept represents
he ability of an organization to meet its ﬁnancial obligations on
ime.
As ﬁnancial condition is a concept that is not directly observable,
iterature has focused on assessing the different aspects or dimen-
ions that compose it (Clark, 1977; Groves, Godsey, & Shulman,
981; Hendrick, 2004; Mercer & Gilbert, 1996). Groves et al. (1981)
ote that ﬁnancial condition is composed of cash solvency (gov-
rnment’s capacity to generate enough cash or liquidity to pay its
ills), budgetary solvency (the city’s ability to generate sufﬁcient
evenues over its normal budgetary period to meet its expenditure
bligations and not incur deﬁcits), long-run solvency (the long-
un ability of a government to pay all the costs of doing business,
ncluding expenditure obligations that normally appear in each
nnual budget, as well as those that show up only in the years in
hich they must be paid), and service-level solvency (it refers to
hether a government can provide the level and quality of ser-
ices required for the general health and welfare of a community),
nd this approach was assumed by the International City/County
anagement Association [ICMA] (2003) for its extensive applica-
ion in local governments in USA.
Another signiﬁcant contribution for the local level is made by the
anadian Institute of Chartered Accountants [CICA] (1997, 2009)
hich assesses the concept through the dimensions of sustaina-
ility (degree to which a government can maintain its existing
nancial obligations without increasing the relative debt or tax bur-
en on the economy within which it operates), ﬂexibility (degree
o which a government can change its debt or tax burden on the
conomy within which it operates to meet its existing ﬁnancial
bligations), and vulnerability (degree to which a government is
ependent on sources of funding outside its control or inﬂuence or
s exposed to risks that could impair its ability to meet its existing
nancial obligations).
To assess the ﬁnancial condition, numerous indicators have been
sed. It should be noted that there has not been a common view in
heir selection, use, and application (CICA, 1997, 2009; Clark, 1977,
994; Groves et al., 1981; Hendrick, 2004; ICMA, 2003).
On the contrary, the ﬁnancial condition of governments and
ocioeconomic variables are interrelated aspects (Carmeli & Cohen,ción y Economía de la Empresa 20 (2014) 110–121 111
2001; Honadle et al., 2004). The characteristics of a socioeco-
nomic environment are diverse and varied in nature, that is, the
economic sectors, nature of the territory, population structure
and population movements, and economic policies developed by
state public institutions (Honadle, 2003). In addition, the ICMA
(2003) includes among the “environmental factors” the vari-
ables of population size, density, the level of unemployment,
and business activity. Wang et al. (2007) analyzed the relation-
ship between the ﬁnancial condition and population (population
size and growth rate) and economic factors (personal income
per capita, gross state product per capita, and percentage change
in personal income), and concluded that these variables can be
used to predict the ﬁnancial condition with a certain level of
accuracy.
2.2. The political factors on the ﬁnancial health of local
governments
The ICMA (2003) considers that issues of a political nature must
also be taken into account among the various factors to consider
in the analysis of the ﬁnancial management of public institutions.
Except the limited study of García-Sánchez et al. (2012), there have
been no empirical studies evaluating the relationship between the
global ﬁnancial situation of public institutions and political fac-
tors, although diverse political factors have been used to predict
speciﬁc aspects of ﬁnancial management (Alesina & Perotti, 1995;
Alesina & Tabellini, 1990; Ashworth, Geys, & Heyndels, 2005; Benito
& Bastida, 2010; Curto-Grau, Solé-Ollé, & Sorribas-Navarro, 2012;
Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro, 2008).
A ﬁrst political issue that we  could not ignore is “The political
cycle theory” or “Political opportunism”, which assumes that the
primary interest of a politician or party is being re-elected and there
are no ideological motives. Franzese (2002) notes that this theory
is focused on the impact of the timing of elections, and this causes
changes in some ﬁnancial variables (debt, deﬁcit, expenses, and
transfers).
The “partisan theory” attributes central importance to the ideo-
logical differences between groups within a society and the parties
that represent these groups (Persson & Svensson, 1989; Tuffe,
1978). In this line, unlike the conservative parties, progressives tend
to increase public spending, showing greater laxity in public ﬁnan-
cial management (Tuffe, 1978). However, this theory has not been
conﬁrmed empirically in some studies at municipal level as in those
made by Bosch and Suarez-Pandiello (1995) and Benito and Bastida
(2010).
Some papers have examined the effect of political decentraliza-
tion on the organization or cohesion of political parties (Desposato,
2004; Wildavsky, 1967). Territorial (local and regional) parties are
thought to exist because these geographical areas have unique
interests and concerns that cannot be or are not being addressed
adequately by existing parties to other level (Brancati, 2008; Hearl,
Budge, & Pearson, 1996).
Following the line of study based on “weak government” or
“fragmented governments”, Roubini and Sachs (1989) initiated a
line of empirical work studying the inﬂuence of fragmentation of
governments on the ﬁnance of public institutions. At the municipal
level, the works that researched any aspect of public ﬁnances have
been few and they have also presented different results (Ashworth
et al., 2005; Borge, 2005; Bruce, Carrol, Deskins, & Rork, 2007;
Geys, 2007; Goeminne, Geys, & Smolders, 2008; Rattsø & Tovmo,
2002).
Another political factor is based on the “hypothesis of the
partisan alignment”. In this context, the research carried out
was articulated from different perspectives: “clientelism” (Diaz-
Cayeros, Magaloni, & Weingast, 2006; Scheiner, 2005), “perverse
accountability” (Stokes, 2005), and the “model of pork barrel”
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Brollo & Nannicini, 2010; Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro, 2008).
f there is a partisan alignment between the municipal govern-
ent and the upper-level government, these entities receive larger
und transfers (Brollo & Nannicini, 2010; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2006;
olé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). The effect of a partisan align-
ent between regional and local governments has been considered
n Spain by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) and by Curto-
rau et al. (2012).
.3. Hypotheses
According to the previous arguments, the aim of our study is
oncretized on the following hypotheses:
ypothesis 1. The ideology of the municipal government affects
he dimensions of ﬁnancial condition of the Spanish municipalities.
ypothesis 2. The territoriality of political parties of the munici-
al government affects the dimensions of ﬁnancial condition of the
panish municipalities.
ypothesis 3. The municipal government’s weakness affects the
imensions of ﬁnancial condition of the Spanish municipalities.
ypothesis 4. The partisan alignment of the municipal govern-
ent affects the dimensions of ﬁnancial condition of the Spanish
unicipalities.
. The ﬁnancial health and political parties in Spanish local
overnments
.1. Data
The very short data series available having adequate detailed
nancial information and the necessity to isolate the impact of
olitical cycle on the global ﬁnancial situation of the municipali-
ies have forced us to use a transversal analysis, and then we  chose
he year 2009 because of its intermediate position in the electoral
ycle of 2007–2011. The ﬁnancial data for our study were col-
ected from the databases of the “Settlement of the Local Budgets
or 2009” and the “Municipal Debt Volume for 2009” (Ministry of
inances and Public Administrations). The data on socioeconomic
ndicators for 2009 were extracted from the “Municipal Database”
f La Caixa and “Inebase” (National Statistics Institute). The infor-
ation on the political variables was extracted from the “Database
f Electoral Results” of the Ministry of Interior and the “Database of
ayors of Legislature 2007–2011” (Ministry of Finances and Public
dministrations).
The work is focused on municipalities with more than 20,000
nhabitants and they represent 70% of the population in Spain. After
ross-checking all the databases and eliminating municipalities
ith incomplete and missing data, Madrid and Barcelona because
hey have a special ﬁnancial legislation, and Ceuta and Melilla for
heir different administrative systems, the sample has 387 of 399
unicipalities with this population level.
.2. Methodology
The complexity of municipal ﬁnances analysis “requires that a
osaic of indicators be employed to account for the multitude of
nternal and external ﬁnancial factors that comprise any given com-
unity’s ﬁnancial proﬁle” (Sohl et al., 2009). In previous studies,
he ﬁnancial dimensions are measured through the assignment of
ndicators by the authors, with any exception (Clark, 1977; Mercer Gilbert, 1996). However, an inconsistent use of indicators dimin-
shes the reliability of a study (Sohl et al., 2009). For this reason,
e used a wide set of ﬁnancial ratios covering the numerous ﬁnan-
ial aspects or dimensions included in the approaches developedcción y Economía de la Empresa 20 (2014) 110–121
by ICMA (2003) and CICA (1997, 2009) because they are the more
institutional relevant frameworks (see Table 1).
As each indicator may  reﬂect aspects of more than one dimen-
sion (Cabaleiro et al., 2012), we will try to associate sets of
indicators with similar variability to the dimensions conceptu-
ally deﬁned by CICA and ICMA, using a multivariate statistical
technique that attempts to overcome the limitations of previous
works. In this sense, to assign univocally the ratios to the different
ﬁnancial aspects, we  applied a sequential, agglomerative and non-
overlapping method (hierarchical clustering with Ward method)
based on the minimization of the variance of the dissimilarity mea-
sure of the squared Euclidean distance.
On each of the clusters of variables obtained, we applied factor
analysis. The purpose is to ﬁnd in each cluster a small number of
uncorrelated aspects that explain the behavior of all the variables
of the group with minimum loss of information. Consequently,
the ﬁnancial dimensions or sub-dimensions obtained by regression
(dependent variables) are integrated by the groups of indicators
that have similar variability, that is, similar behavior (Cabaleiro
et al., 2012; Clark, 1977; Mercer & Gilbert, 1996). Each of these
blocks/groups was  identiﬁed in coherence with its information and
by taking into account the ﬁnancial dimensions or sub-dimensions
from the ICMA and CICA frameworks.
To analyze how the political variables (ideology, territori-
ality of political parties, government weakness, and partisan
alignment) (Table 2) might affect the dimensions that make
up the ﬁnancial condition of municipalities, we test if mean
values are different. To do this, we  performed an analysis of
variance–covariance.
As noted above, socioeconomic factors are conﬁgured as
elements of contrasted inﬂuence. For this reason, we must
control the effect of demographic and economic environment
variables (Table 3) on the ﬁnancial condition of the municipali-
ties.
3.3. Analysis of results
Following the methodological process described, after typifying
all the ﬁnancial variables (I1 to I39), we performed a cluster analysis
of the variables. Fig. 1 shows the dendrogram where six groups of
ﬁnancial ratios (FG1 to FG6) can be clearly identiﬁed (see the cut
line for rescaled distance = 10).
Following the methodology described, the technique of factor
analysis was applied within each one of these groups and has led
us to identify the following dependent variables, that is, ﬁnancial
groups (FG) (Table 4):
- FG1 (R4, R5, R6, R7, R13, R11, and R12): They are basically
indicators related to the dimension of long-term solvency. This
group has two distinct behaviors or dimensions (factors). The
ﬁrst aspect gives more importance to the indicators related to
the volume of debt of the entity (R4, R5, R6, R7, R13) (FG1 1).
The second behavior gives more importance to the indicators
R1 and R12 and an opposite direction to the other. This refers
to the speed with which the entity is to amortize its debt
(FG1 2).
-  FG2 (R26, R27, R19, R18, R20, R17, R16, and R21) represents
a homogeneous group of indicators essentially concerned with
budgetary solvency derived from the entity’s ability to generate
its own income (FG2 1).- FG3 (R28, R36, R31, R34, R38, R29, R15, R30, R33, and R39) basi-
cally consists of a set of service ratios and income tax ratios related
to economic activity in the municipal environment with similar
variability to all local government revenue. This seems to reﬂect
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Table 1
Financial indicators.
Indicator Description Min.
Max.
Mean
Std. D
R1 (CCE+AR-DAR-EF)/OO Reﬁned short-term solvency: Cash and Cash Equivalents (CCE) plus accounts receivable (AR), less doubtful accounts
receivable (DAR) and excess funds to ﬁnance expenditures earmarked funding (EF), divided by outstanding
obligations (OO) at year end.
−1.1296 1.5066
11.0873 1.6055
R2 (CCE+AR–DAR)/OO Gross short-term solvency: Cash and Cash Equivalents (CCE) plus accounts receivable (AR) and less doubtful accounts receivable (DAR), divided by the
outstanding obligations (OO) at year end.
−0.8021 2.2364
13.3634 2.0883
R3 CCE/OO Quick Ratio: Cash and Cash Equivalents (CCE) divided by outstanding obligations (OO) at year end. −0.8593 1.1921
9.1112 1.6058
R4 Long-term debt/TNBR Long-term debt in relation to the total net budgetary revenues (TNBR) 0.0000 0.4574
1.2448 0.2433
R5 Long-term debt/NBR Ch.a 1–8 Long-term debt divided by net budgetary revenues (NBR) from non-ﬁnancial operations. 0.0000 0.4887
1.3883 0.2657
R6 Long-term debt/NBR Ch. 1–5 Ratio between the long-term debt and net budgetary revenues from current operations. 0.0000 0.5851
1.9421 0.3221
R7 Long-term debt/Pop. Long-term debt per inhabitant (Pop) 0.0000 521.8737
1870.3005 323.2263
R8 NBR  Ch. 1–5/NBO Ch. 1–4 Net current budgetary revenues divided by net budget obligations (NBO) from current expenditures 0.6062 1.0993
1.5524 0.1227
R9 NBR  Ch. 1 a 5/NBO Ch. 1–4 and 9 Net current budgetary revenues divided by budget obligations from non-ﬁnancial current expenditures and debt service. 0.5750 1.0502
1.4689 0.1229
R10Net  savings/Pop. Difference between the receivables from current budget resources and the budget obligations from non-ﬁnancial current expenditures, minus debt
service per inhab.
−616.8927 24.1831
608.4843 123.6380
R11NBO  Ch. 3 and 9/NBR Ch. 1–5 Debt service (interest and principal) divided by net current budgetary revenues 0.0000 0.0798
0.7883 0.0766
R12NBO  Ch. 3 and 9/Pop. Debt service per inhabitant. 0.0000 70.4389
554.4883 64.9648
R13NBO  Ch. 3/Pop. Debt interest per inhabitant. 0.0000 14.9772
68.9641 13.0068
R14RBS/Pop. Result of the budget settlement (RBS) per inhabitant. −442.3983 −3.8714
511.9483 135.5810
R15Total  NBR/Pop. Total net budgetary revenues per inhabitant. 515.9096 1135.235
2751.8405 303.1544
R16NBR  Ch. 1–5/NBR Ch. 4 Ratio between net current budgetary revenues and current grants received. 1.4400 3.2518
8.6505 1.0269
R17NBR  Ch. 1–3/NBO Ch. 1–3 Direct and indirect taxes and fees divided by obligations from net expenditure of personnel, services and debt interest. 0.3450 0.7763
1.9859 0.1760
R18NBR  Ch. 1–3/NBO Ch. 1–4 Direct and indirect taxes and fees divided by net budget obligations from current expenditures. 0.3320 0.7003
1.2644 0.1398
R19NBR  Ch. 1–3/Pop. Direct and indirect taxes and fees per inhabitant. 172.2499 576.7365
1711.3735 211.6842
R20NBR  Ch. 1 and 3–5/NBO Ch. 1–4 Net current budgetary revenues less current grants received, divided by net budget obligations (NBO) from current expenditures. 0.3550 0.7321
1.2685 0.1491
R21NBR  Ch. 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9/Total NBO Difference between total net budgetary revenues and budgetary current and capital transfers received divided by total net budget obligations. 0.2485 0.5994
1.1400 0.1307
R22NBR  Ch. 7/Pop. Capital transfers received per inhabitant 23.3007 151.9534
566.4735 65.6506
R23NBR  Ch. 4 and 7/Pop. Current and capital transfers received per inhabitant 227.1974 442.9539
1011.9293 127.7745
R24NBO  Ch. 6 and 7/Pop. Investments per inhabitant: Net budget obligations from capital expenditures, capital transfers and capital grants per inhabitant. 37.9950 263.1461
746.5829 122.8229
R25NBO  Ch. 6 and 7/Total NBO Investments effort: Net budget obligations from capital expenditures, capital transfers and capital grants divided by total net budget obligations. 0.0360 0.2279
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Table 1 (Continued)
Indicator Description Min.
Max.
Mean
Std. D
0.5036 0.0781
R26 NBR  Ch. 1 and 2/Pop. Tax revenues per inhabitant. 110.1501 389.6998
949.1808 146.7996
R27 NBR  Ch. 1, art. 1/Pop. Capital tax revenues per inhabitant. 99.2524 328.5324
912.2925 132.5457
R28 NBR  Ch. 1, art. 3/Pop. Economic activity tax revenues per inhabitant. 5.2736 31.1589
210.9601 26.4245
R29 NBR  Ch. 2/Pop. Indirect tax revenues per inhabitant. 1.1352 25.6133
227.8817 24.6589
R30 NBR  Ch. 3/Pop. Taxes and public fees for services provided per inhabitant 41.8411 187.0366
981.4307 102.6173
R31 Politic.Expend.b 13/Pop. Expenditures on civil protection, public safety, vehicle trafﬁc, and ﬁre protection per inhabitant. 4.3280 95.6370
269.4893 40.1052
R32 Politic.Expend. 15/Pop. Expenditures on housing development and urban planning per inhabitant. 0.0000 150.9430
522.9775 97.3866
R33 Politic.Expend. 16/Pop. Community welfare spending (Water supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment, municipal waste collection, street cleaning, cemeteries, street
lighting) per inhabit.
0.0000 163.3166
793.1111 82.8298
R34 Politic.Expend. 17/Pop. Expenditures on environmental protection per inhabitant 0.0000 39.5123
230.3696 31.0866
R35 Areac Expend. 2/Pop. Expenditure on social services agency and promoting employment per inhabitant. 24.0672 131.1722
392.2389 58.4665
R36 Area  Expend. 3/Pop. Expenditure on preferential public service (Health, education, culture and sport) per inhabitant 26.4085 209.3143
620.2904 98.6590
R37 Area  Expend. 4/Pop. Expenditure on promotion of economic activity per inhabitant 0.6357 72.4249
539.8732 73.9392
R38 Politic.Expend. 91/Pop. Expenditure on salaries of political governing per inhabitant 0.0000 22.6730
102.5483 11.2454
R39 Politic.Expend. 92/Pop. Expenditure on general services (administrative staff and expenses) per inhabitant 0.0000 135.6030
736.6846 94.8837
Valid N (listwise) 387.
a Chapter of the economic classiﬁcation of the budgets in Spain.
b Policy of expenditure on the Planning Programming Budgeting System in Spain.
c Area of expenditure on the Planning Programming Budgeting System in Spain.
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Fig. 1. Clustering process of ﬁnancial variables.
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Table 2
Political variables.
Political variable Description Freq Relative freq (%)
(PV1) Ideology Progressive (1) 204 52.7
Conservative (2) 151 39.0
Not  deﬁned (3) 32 8.3
(PV2)  Territoriality of political
parties
National (1) 321 82.9
Regional (2) 46 11.9
Local (3) 20 5.2
(PV3)  Government weakness Government party with absolute
majority (1)
190 49.1
Government party without absolute
majority (0)
197 50.9
(PV4) Partisan alignment
(PV4 1) Provincial The same political party that governs
the municipality also governs the
province (1)
235 60.7
The  political party that governs the
municipality does not govern the
province (0)
152 39.3
(PV4 2) Regional The same political party that governs
the municipality also governs the
Autonomous Community (1)
213 55.0
The  political party that governs the
municipality does not govern the
Autonomous Community (0)
174 45.0
V
-
-
-
c
c
o
v
a
g
e
e
ﬁ
f
a
(alid N (listwise) 387.
a level of solvency of services of each entity, which is linked to
the activity of local economic environment (FG3 1).
 FG4 (R24, R25, R32, R22, R23, R35, and R37). This group is
composed of indicators of transfers, investments, and certain
spending policies. This seems to reﬂect a degree of ﬁnancial
dependence on other institutions to provide certain services
and investment. The factor analysis shows the existence of
two distinct behaviors or dimensions. The ﬁrst shows a sim-
ilar behavior between transfers received and transfers made,
the real investments, and housing and urban policies and
to a lesser extent, the spending policies of social protec-
tion and economic policies (FG4 1). The second component
reﬂects a different behavior of the policies of social protection
expenditure and economic policies in relation to investments
and transfers made (FG4 2); that is, it displays the extent
to which the local entity opts for performing one or other
expenses.
 FG5 (R2, R3, and R1): The group is only composed of indicators of
short-term solvency or cash solvency (FG5 1).
 FG6 (R8, R9, R10, and R14): The group is only composed of indi-
cators of current and overall balanced budget. This represents
general budgetary solvency (FG6 1).
Once we identiﬁed and obtained the values of the ﬁnan-
ial dimensions and subdimensions that comprise the ﬁnancial
ondition using the regression method, we analyzed the extent
f differences based on political factors through an analysis of
ariance/covariance, controlling the inﬂuence of socioeconomic
spects.
We found that the normality of the residuals and the homo-
eneity of variances were met  and the test of between-subjects
ffects indicates that political factors have statistically signiﬁcant
ffects only on the volume of debt (FG1 1), on the degree of
nancial dependence on transfers from other institutions to per-
orm certain services, particularly for real investments and housing
nd planning policies (FG4 1), and on balanced budget (FG6 1)
Table 5).Ideology. The model reﬂects a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the ideol-
ogy factor (PV1) on the volume of debt of the entity (FG1 1) and
on the dimension of cash solvency (FG5 1) (Table 5). Speciﬁcally,
the municipalities governed by political parties that have no ideol-
ogy clearly positioned (not deﬁned) as progressive or conservative
have a level of debt (FG1 1) signiﬁcantly lower than that of the
entities that are governed by progressive parties or conservative
parties (see Table 6). The mean differences between progressives
and conservatives parties are not signiﬁcant. The mean differences
in relation to the cash solvency dimension (FG5 1) (Table 6) also
show that the entities governed by the parties without an ideo-
logical option deﬁned have higher standards of cash solvency than
municipalities managed by progressive parties or by conservative
parties.
Territoriality of political parties.  The territorial nature of polit-
ical parties (PV2) only has a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the variable (FG4 1) dependence on transfers (Table 5). There-
fore, PV2 is only inﬂuencing the ratio between transfers received
and transfers made, the real investments, housing and urban poli-
cies and, to a lesser extent, the implementation of policies of
social protection and economic policies. Speciﬁcally, municipali-
ties governed by regional political parties have a higher level of
dependence on transfers than those governed by national parties
(Table 7).
Government’s weakness. The government’s weakness (PV3) sig-
niﬁcantly inﬂuences the dimensions FG4 1 and FG6 1 (Table 5).
The mean differences (Table 8) indicate that municipalities gov-
erned by parties that have an absolute showed a different behavior
in relation to fund transfers received and transfers made, real
investments, housing and urban development policies (FG4 1). The
results seem to move in the opposite direction to the conclusions
of Bruce et al. (2007). They note that infrastructure investments are
higher when governments lack unity.
In addition, if the ruling parties have an absolute majority, they
improve the balance in budgets (FG6 1) (Table 8).
Partisan alignment.  We  could not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence to
support the partisan alignment of the municipal governments
(PV4 1 and PV4 2).
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Table 3
Socieconomic variables.
Socioeconomic variable Description Min. Mean
Max. Std. D
(SV1) Population Population of municipality. 2009. 20040.00 69250.64
809267.00 92007.48
(SV2)  Immigrants Registered inhabitants who  have no Spanish nationality in the municipality as a percentage of total population. 2009. 0.0166 0.1528
0.7547 0.1083
(SV3)  Population change
(2004–2009)
Variation of the total number of inhabitants in the municipality between 2004 and 2009 (%) −0.0491 0.0984
0.5220 0.0940
(SV4)  Immigrants change
(2004–2009)
Variation of the number of immigrants in the municipality between 2004 and 209 (%) 0.0814 0.6073
2.2511 0.2991
(SV5)  Density Number of inhabitants per square kilometer. 2009. 25.85 1750.08
21896.00 2950.26
(SV6)  Unemployment index Number of unemployed registered in the Public Employment Service in each municipality in relation to the potentially active population (15–64 years). July
1,  2009.
0.0530 0.1328
0.2630 0.0357
(SV7)  Unemployment
evolution
Variation of the number of unemployed registered in the Public Employment Service in each municipality in relation to the potentially active population
(15–64  years) between 2004 and 2009 (%)
0.2323 1.1616
5.0714 0.6381
(SV8)  Economic activity index Comparative index of the extent of all economic activity. The index, covering the year 2009, is made by La Caixa (2011) according to the tax (share price) of
the  economic activity tax for all business and professionals economic activities for estimation and reﬂects the relative weight of economic activity of the
municipality with respect to the total of Spain in base 100,000. The indicator that we  use is the index of economic activity of La Caixa multiplied by 100,000
and  divided by the population
1.5782 18.9674
243.4437 30.6042
(SV9)  Economic activity
evolution
Variation of the economic activity index between 2004 and 2009 (%) −0.4835 −0.0328
2.0690 0.2312
Valid N (listwise) 387.
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Table 4
Process of factor analysis.
Financial group FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 FG5 FG6
Indicators R4, R5, R6, R7, R13,
R11, and R12
R26, R27, R19, R18,
R20, R17, R16, and R21
R28, R36, R31, R34, R38, R29,
R15, R30, R33, and R39
R24, R25, R32, R22,
R23, R35, and R37
R2, R3, and R1 R8, R9, R10, and
R14
Components
Num. 2 1 1 2 1 1
KMO
Sampl.  adequacy 0.696 0.900 0.754 0.618 0.703 0.790
Bartlett  test
Approx. chi-square 4819.295 4398.222 1017.577 1206.392 1831.944 1704.970
df  21 28 45 21 3 6
Sig.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Variance explained (%) FG1 1:
68.498
FG1 2:
19.670
FG2 1: 79.653 FG3 1: 78.293 FG4 1:
44.245
FG4 2:
18.910
FG5 1: 95.930 FG6 1: 80.434
Communalities R4
R5
R6
R7
R13
R11
R12
0.957
0.956
0.944
0.879
0.501
0.960
0.974
R26
R27
R19
R18
R20
R17
R16
R21
0.804
0.778
0.812
0.832
0.831
0.754
0.824
0.738
R28
R36
R31
R34
R38
R29
R15
R30
R33
R39
0.090
0.219
0.155
0.095
0.121
0.038
0.993
0.570
0.368
0.113
R24
R25
R32
R22
R23
R35
R37
0.858
0.761
0.624
0.559
0.707
0.458
0.453
R2
R3
R1
0.987
0.950
0.921
R8
R9
R10
R14
0.930
0.915
0.816
0.556
Extraction method: principal component analysis.
Component matrix
FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 FG5 FG6
FG1 1 FG1 2 FG2 1 FG3 1 FG4 1 FG4 2 FG5 1 FG6 1
R4 0.912 −0.353 R26 0.897 R28 0.300 R24 0.894 −0.243 R2 0.994 R8 0.964
R5  0.949 −0.234 R27 0.882 R36 0.467 R25 0.795 −0.359 R3 0.975 R9 0.957
R6  0.950 −0.205 R19 0.901 R31 0.394 R32 0.576 −0.541 R1 0.960 R10 0.904
R7  0.918 −0.189 R18 0.912 R34 0.308 R22 0.730 0.161 R14 0.746
R13  0.706 −0.058 R20 0.911 R38 0.348 R23 0.740 0.399
R11  0.613 0.764 R17 0.869 R29 0.194 R35 0.398 0.547
R12  0.665 0.729 R16 0.908 R15 0.997 R37 0.307 0.599
R21  0.859 R30 0.755
R33 0.607
R39 0.337
Component scores standardized functions (regression method)
FG1
FG1 1 FG1 1i = 0.190 · R4i + 0.198 · R5i + 0.198 · R6i + 0.192 · R7i + 0.147 · R13i + 0.128 · R11i + 0.139 · R12i
FG1 2 FG1 2i = −0.256 · R4i − 0.170 · R5i − 0.149 · R6i − 0.137 · R7i − 0.042 · R13i + 0.555 · R11i + 0.530 · R12i
FG2 FG2i = 0.141·R26i + 0.138·R27i + 0.141·R19i + 0.143·R18i + 0.143·R20i + 0.136·R17i + 0.142·R16i + 0.135·R21i
FG3 FG3i = 0.002·R28i + 0.044·R36i + 0.006·R31i + 0.003·R34i + 0.001·R38i + 0.001·R29i + 0.886·R15i + 0.077·R30i + 0.040·R33i + 0.029·R39i
FG4
FG4 1 FG4 1i = 0.289·R24i + 0.257·R25i + 0.186·R32i + 0.236·R22i + 0.239·R23i + 0.129·R35i + 0.099·R37i
FG4 2 FG4 2i = −0.184·R24i − 0.271·R25i − 0.408·R32i + 0.122·R22i + 0.301·R23i + 0.413·R35i +0.453·R37i
FG5 FG5i = 0.475·R2i + 0.275·R3i + 0.271·R1i
FG6 FG6i = 0.300·R8i + 0.297·R9i + 0.281·R10i + 0.232·R14i
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Table  5
Tests of between-subjects effects.
Source Dependent variable
FG1 1 FG1 2 FG2 1 FG3 1 FG4 1 FG4 2 FG5 1 FG6 1
P-value
Corrected model 0.001** 0.952 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.078 0.003**
Intercept 0.049* 0.093 0.918 0.234 0.000** 0.113 0.452 0.433
(PV1)  Ideology 0.023* 0.782 0.542 0.384 0.453 0.476 0.026* 0.942
(PV2)  Territoriality of political parties 0.441 0.909 0.826 0.098 0.004** 0.156 0.513 0.641
(PV3)  Government weakness 0.11 0.999 0.831 0.252 0.029* 0.675 0.109 0.018*
(PV4 1) Provincial partisan alignment 0.274 0.879 0.337 0.233 0.378 0.163 0.147 0.203
PV4  2) Regional partisan alignment 0.096 0.328 0.781 0.172 0.273 0.804 0.15 0.574
(PV1)  Ideology * (PV2) territoriality of political parties 0.488 0.651 0.447 0.333 0.429 0.465 0.985 0.994
(PV1)  Ideology * (PV3) government weakness 0.384 0.873 0.341 0.735 0.253 0.762 0.513 0.707
(PV1)  Ideology * (PV4 1) provincial partisan alignment 0.976 0.454 0.229 0.008** 0.535 0.005** 0.268 0.185
(PV1) Ideology * (PV4 2) regional partisan alignment 0.428 0.628 0.609 0.000** 0.003** 0.004** 0.178 0.104
(SV1)  Population 0.176 0.223 0.041* 0.000** 0.000** 0.815 0.627 0.175
(SV2)  Immigrants 0.003** 0.173 0.000** 0.000** 0.104 0.006** 0.391 0.009**
(SV3) Population change (2004–2009) 0.304 0.836 0.001** 0.634 0.000** 0.006** 0.912 0.181
(SV4)  Immigrants change (2004–2009) 0.476 0.440 0.003** 0.349 0.066 0.003** 0.605 0.292
(SV5)  Density 0.002** 0.977 0.003** 0.024* 0.084 0.625 0.844 0.217
(SV6)  Unemployment index 0.024* 0.232 0.002** 0.000** 0.000** 0.184 0.104 0.214
(SV7)  Unemployment evolution 0.773 0.584 0.095 0.383 0.028* 0.013* 0.647 0.966
(SV8)  Economic activity index 0.484 0.354 0.008** 0.000** 0.001** 0.673 0.636 0.136
(SV9)  Economic activity evolution 0.61 0.834 0.652 0.393 0.495 0.576 0.914 0.418
* Signiﬁcant at 0.05.
** Signiﬁcant at 0.01.
Table 6
Pairwise comparisons. Dependent variables FG1 1 and FG5 1.
(I) (PV1) Ideology (1, 2, 3) (J) (PV1) Ideology (1, 2, 3) Mean difference (I−J) Std. error Sig. 95% conﬁdence interval for
difference
Lower bound Upper bound
Dependent variable: FG1 1
(1)Progressive (2) Conservative −0.588a 0.380 0.122 −1.335 0.159
(3)  Not deﬁned 0.663a,* ,b 0.259 0.011 0.153 1.173
(2)Conservative (1) Progressive 0.588b 0.380 0.122 −0.159 1.335
(3)  Not deﬁned 1.251**,b 0.402 0.002 0.461 2.042
(3)Not deﬁned (1) Progressive −0.663a,* ,b 0.259 0.011 −1.173 −0.153
(2)  Conservative −1.251a,** 0.402 0.002 −2.042 −0.461
Dependent variable:FG5 1
(1)Progressive (2) Conservative 0.588a 0.387 0.130 −0.174 1.350
(3)  Not deﬁned −0.736a,* ,b 0.265 0.006 −1.256 −0.215
(2)Conservative (1)  Progressive −0.588b 0.387 0.130 −1.350 0.174
(3)  Not deﬁned −1.323*,b 0.410 0.001 −2.130 −0.517
(3)Not  deﬁned (1) Progressive 0.736a,* ,b 0.265 0.006 0.215 1.256
(2)  Conservative 1.323a,* 0.410 0.001 0.517 2.130
Based on estimated marginal means.
** Signiﬁcant at 0.01.
* Signiﬁcant at 0.05.
a An estimate of the modiﬁed population marginal mean (I).
b An estimate of the modiﬁed population marginal mean (J).
Table 7
Pairwise comparisons. Dependent variable FG4 1.
(I) (PV2) Territorial nature
of the political party
(J) (PV2) Territorial nature
of the political party
Mean difference (I−J) Std. error Sig. 95% conﬁdence interval for
difference
Lower bound Upper bound
(1)National (2) Regional −0.569a 0.177 0.001 −0.918 −0.220
(3)  Local −0.162a,b 0.493 0.742 −1.132 0.808
(2)Regional (1) National 0.569b 0.177 0.001 0.220 0.918
(3)  Local 0.407b 0.541 0.452 −0.656 1.470
(3)Local (1) National 0.162a,b 0.493 0.742 −0.808 1.132
(2)  Regional −0.407a 0.541 0.452 −1.470 0.656
Based on estimated marginal means.
a An estimate of the modiﬁed population marginal mean (I).
b An estimate of the modiﬁed population marginal mean (J).
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Table 8
Pairwise comparisons. Dependent variables FG4 1 and FG6 1.
(I) (PV3) Government weakness (J) (PV3) Government weakness Mean difference (I−J) Std. error Sig. 95% conﬁdence interval for
difference
Lower bound Upper bound
Dependent variable: FG4 1
(0) Party without absolute majority (1) Party with absolute majority −0.318a,b 0.143 0.027 −0.599 −0.037
(1)  Party with absolute majority (0) Party without absolute majority 0.318a,b 0.143 0.027 0.037 0.599
Dependent variable: FG6 1
(0) Party without absolute majority (1) Party with absolute majority −0.389a,b 0.162 0.017 −0.707 −0.070
(1)  Party with absolute majority (0) Party without absolute majority 0.389a,b 0.162 0.017 0.070 0.707
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. Conclusions
Many works in the literature have studied the effects of vari-
us political situations on public ﬁnancial management. They have
ocused on the analysis of speciﬁc ﬁnancial issues such as debt,
eﬁcits, transfers, expenses, income, or taxes, using as independent
ariables speciﬁc political factors, such as ideology, government
eakness, political cycles, and partisan alignment. In contrast to
hese previous works, we have used a global concept of the ﬁnan-
ial health of public institutions, that is, the ﬁnancial condition,
nd on this basis, we analyzed the incidence of multiple political
actors.
Using a multivariate approach and a very large set of ﬁnancial
ndicators (39) on almost all Spanish municipalities with pop-
lation on over 20,000, we have identiﬁed 8 different ﬁnancial
imensions or sub-dimensions within the overall concept of ﬁnan-
ial condition.
As the aim of our study was to understand the possible relation-
hip between the essence of the policy options and all aspects of
he ﬁnancial condition of Spanish municipalities, we selected the
ost distant year of elections in order to eliminate possible effects
f the electoral process.
We found that those parties that have no clear ideological posi-
ion show a debt management and a short-term solvency better
han parties identiﬁed ideologically as progressives or conser-
atives. In our study, we could not ﬁnd that the municipalities
overned by progressive or conservative parties differ in their
nancial health. Similar results were obtained by Alesina and
abellini (1990), and Franzese (2002), and opposite results were
btained by Persson and Svensson (1989).
Our analysis of ﬁnancial condition allowed us to identify a ﬁnan-
ial behavior about ratio between transfers received and transfers
ade, the real investments, housing and urban policies and, to a
esser extent, the implementation of policies of social protection
nd economic policies. This behavior is clearly inﬂuenced by the
erritoriality of political parties, which conﬁrms the theory of Hearl
t al. (1996) and Brancati (2008), and the government’s weakness,
hich seems to move in the opposite direction to the conclusions
f Bruce et al. (2007). They note that infrastructure investments
re higher when governments lack unity, and this conclusion was
onﬁrmed by Goeminne et al. (2008) in the Flemish municipali-
ies.
Moreover, our study conﬁrms the government weak hypothe-
is in Spanish municipalities, because the municipalities in which
here is no political party with an absolute majority present major
scal imbalances (Alesina & Perotti, 1995; Roubini & Sachs, 1989).
n addition, we could not verify the inﬂuence of the partisan align-
ent on any ﬁnancial dimension, which contrasts notably with
hose noted by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) and Curto-
rau et al. (2012).References
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